Setting the Scene for the First Five-Year Plan – a bit more Marxist Theory and Practice

From 1953 onwards the transition to socialism was thus deemed ready to begin as the political system was already relatively advanced (in Marxist terms) after the above consolidations. The economy now had to catch up (and catch up with the economies of the imperialist powers that were now predicted to be enemies). The great Chinese proletariat now needed to be awakened from its slumber in a traditional Marxist fashion. The first models for the workers of the cities to chomp on were the collectivisation already beginning in the countryside and all of the changes already occurring in the cities (see my last post). The best model Mao knew of for the cities and industry, however, was the Soviet one. Stalinist central planning (and tight control there) was to be the go from now on. But let’s consider what theory and practice Mao was working with before we get to the first five-year plan and the alleged real ‘transition to socialism’.

The first issue to be addressed now (in Marxist terms) was the need to resolve the contradictions between advanced socialist politics and society and the backward Capitalist economic ‘foundation’ by developing productive forces. So were the answers Soviet-style central state planning and the ‘command’ economy? Yes, according to what Mao had learned of Marxism so far (in theory and practice).

Here’s a bit of that theory and practice:

Marx began with some theory. He said the market under competition was unable to produce rational results in terms of resource allocation and was the inevitable source of labour exploitation. It was also wasteful especially because it produced bankruptcies.

Lenin then added his two cents attempting to study the methods of capitalists in order to find how socialists might learn from them. So he wasn’t as keen as Marx apparently was to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Specifically he sought to discover their management and economic coordination secrets. This was so that the central government could produce production plans that would be more rational than any unguided market could produce and bring them to fruition by rational allocation of resources that he considered only a centralised state could accomplish. He saw technology as ‘neutral’ in terms of whether it could be equally well employed by capitalists and socialists.

Then along came Alexander Bogdanov to propose the ‘science’ of state economic planning. He said the science required ‘a gigantic statistical bureau based on exact calculations for the purpose of distributing labour power and the instruments of labour’. So a large bureaucracy would be required.

Stalin’s contribution was somewhat fetishistic. It was his focus on the promotion of heavy industry in particular. In especially heavy industry he saw the ‘spiritual’ basis of socialism as he thought by its very nature it transformed workers into socialists.

So there Mao had his models. The market could not be allowed to do its usual jobs in capitalism, only the centralised state could do the job and it must be done scientifically with a large bureaucracy and heavy industrialisation must be a priority.

Here are a few practical and theoretical reasons why the Soviet model of planned development as by then being modelled by Stalin seemed naturally to be what was required of any half decent Marxist state:

1) The USSR was seen in the early 50s as economically successful especially as it had been successful in defeating Nazi Germany (Mao was never a fan of the political advice he received from the Soviets – after all it had advised him to work with the GMD twice – but he thought he couldn’t reasonably argue with its economics);

2) The USSR was among the PRC’s few allies at the time;

3) The USSR had actual experience to impart and advisors were thus seen as ‘elder brothers’;

4) The Soviet model had been carefully and successfully justified in orthodox Marxist/Leninist terms; and

5) There would be ‘strings attached’ to increased support from the Soviets.