Globalisation and Legitimacy

So what sustains party legitimacy in a globalised China of Jiang and Hu that is no longer recognisably Communist to many? Who runs China therefore and under what ideology if any? I’ll consider those questions in this post and in the next I’ll consider the very important question of what the key problems are in the vital countryside and the action the CCP is taking in attempting to resolve them.

Many in the West predicted that the CCP would go the way of the Communist parties of Eastern Europe. Evidently they saw the breakdown of Communist ideology as necessitating an end to the rule of Communist parties. I may ask why the CCP alone has been able to maintain its legitimacy but I should also allow that it may not be for all time. Nevertheless it has remained in power and there must be a reason.

The CCP has given thought to this question and has come up with five basic reasons for its legitimacy:

1) It has fostered and maintained enormous levels of economic growth;

2) Consequently living standards have increased [although inequality has also increased markedly, of course];

3) Especially from the mid 1990s, it has tried to promote its aims as nationalist and in the national interest (they point to what they promote as a successful history);

4) They are able to maintain social stability in accordance with their ‘neo-authoritarian’ and ‘Asian Values’ philosophies; and

5) They are working on improving their ethical standards and stamping out corruption.

Perhaps the most promising of these bases of legitimacy in the medium term is the appeal to nationalism but it is a double edged sword.

The powerful ‘culture fever’ that erupted following the CR was partly about reasserting pride in China’s imperial past and national pride generally at China’s historical and ongoing global status and is a positive asset to China as well as CCP legitimacy. Yet pride in turn has depended upon the recent advance in living standards to a large extent and has been dampened by a sense of humiliation at the unfairness of US hegemony and the success of Japan. The expected return of Taiwan to the Chinese fold has become a symbol of the reversal of that humiliation and Taiwan is not necessarily expected to be the be all and end all of that process. Japan is still sometimes seen as an enemy and not sufficiently punished for various war crimes.

The CCP is ‘cashing in’ on these feelings of humiliation in order to promote the sense of unity that it feels is in its immediate interests. This can be seen as necessary to provide the ostensible raison d’être for a post-Marxist CCP government but here is where nationalism has become a two edged sword. The government can also be criticised for the pace at which it addresses the humiliation of a great nation or fails to sufficiently represent the national interest well enough generally. Examples of this problem of popular nationalism include the reaction to WTO negotiations in 2001 (where the CCP was accused of giving away too much) and accusations that China has been too soft on Japan over wartime atrocities.

The CCP’s reaction to the above potential threat to its legitimacy has been to learn the lesson of Tiananmen. Party thinkers in leadership tend to see the lesson as: cracking down hard and early on dissent promotes stability.

Their verdict on Tiananmen has remained unchanged in recent years (despite recent talk of a re-evaluation) as evidenced by the extended prison terms (11 years) meted out to various democracy activists more recently (such as those of the China Democracy Party) and not since commuted (the re-evaluation of the ‘incident’ is yet to materialise).

The approach to the Falun Dafa (Falun Gong) is another result of this reaction. Practitioners were declared an ‘evil cult’ in 1999 and suppressed following a sit-in protest of around 10,000 of them following a scathing editorial against the group. The protest saw them surrounding Zhongnanhai (the residential area in central Beijing near Tiananmen reserved for much of the CCP high leadership). The evil seems to be that it is a challenge to CCP ideology. The group is critical of much of what the current CCP government seems to stand for. Jiang was the main hardliner at the time when it came to cracking down on what is actually a fairly harmless breathing practice called qigong. For more on suppression of this group, go to the group’s own websites.

The other issues being cracked down on are ethnic in nature and concern the Tibetans mainly in Tibet and the Muslims (mainly Uighur and mainly in Xinjiang (called East Turkistan or Uighurstan especially by some separatists)). The “War of Terror” almost couldn’t have come at a better time from the point of view of the CCP. The Chinese government now feels it more or less has the cover it needs to crack down as necessary and it does crack down (whether real terrorism is involved or not) as necessary. Of course China hasn’t been alone in revelling in the cover provided. Russia and Israel are two other notable cases, not to mention the US itself.

Who is in power (if not Marxists) is another question. The year 2002 marked a changing of the guard when Hu came to power but also most of the Politburo was also replaced.

Jiang finished his term as Party Secretary in 2002 (relinquishing that role to Hu) but provided some of the answers to that question as he left this formal role with his Three Represents.

The CCP constitution was amended in 2002 so that the ideology of the party was now formally: Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory and the important Ideology of “the Three Represents (三个代表)”. This last was what the party now stood for (represented). It stood for the most advanced forces of production, the most advanced culture and the fundamental interests of the broadest mass of the people. The shift here was that this suggested it was no longer a party explicitly of workers; it could also be the party of their bosses, and of intellectuals and artists. It now represented ‘advanced elements’ (who by virtue of being that were now also the only people eligible to be members of the party – so you could also be a worker and not eligible) rather than revolutionaries – the revolution was now over. This really just formalised what had already become the practice.

The leadership as I’ve mentioned was also shaken up. Hu assumed the leadership although he was the second youngest of the nine Politburo Standing Committee members.

All but one of the group were also qualified engineers (predominantly from the one technology university that Hu trained in engineering at, Qinghua) – the outlier, Wen Jiabao, was a geologist (trained at the Beijing Institute of Geology). Wen’s case shows that it was possible to be mentored in the party by a discredited leader (Zhao Ziyang in Wen’s case) and still reach the second or third highest rank in the PRC. Only Hu was kept on from the previous group and he was also the only member remaining who had been mentored by Deng. Most had been mentored by Jiang. There’s a joke in China that Qinghua produces China’s leaders and Beida (Beijing University) produces its prisoners. Here’s the group:

Name	Age	Profession	University	Mentor
Hu Jintao	59	Engineer	Qinghua	Deng Xiaoping
Wu Bangguo	61	Engineer	Qinghua	Jiang Zemin
Wen Jiabao	60	Geologist	Beijing Institute of Geology	Zhao Ziyang
Jia Qinglin	62	Engineer	Hebei Engineering College	Jiang Zemin
Zeng Qinghong	63	Engineer	Beijing Institute of Technology	Jiang Zemin
Huang Ju	64	Engineer	Qinghua	Jiang Zemin
Wu Guanzheng	64	Engineer	Qinghua	Jiang Zemin
Li Changchun	58	Engineer	Harbin Institute of Technology	Jiang Zemin
Luo Gan	67	Engineer	Beijing Institute of Iron & Steel	Li Peng

So it’s a technocratic group that have been well mentored in the business of government in the new China and that embraces the new business elites (who might otherwise become an opposition). The training of the group is not in political change, it’s in technocratic problem-solving and that is their focus.

This currently suits the business elites with whom they are intimately linked so it’s not yet in the interests of the business middle class to challenge the political position of this type of problem-solving state. From the orthodox Marxist point of view it is also still possible to view the business class as powerful and imaginative allies provided they remain securely yoked to the benefit of the CPP dictatorship. The times in China are indeed still interesting for Marxists today. To paraphrase Sun Zi, the CCP is keeping its friends close and its (at least potential) enemies closer. And the policy is currently working as the potential enemies are currently being kept happy with the amount of (close) influence they are able to have upon reforms as they occur.

In 2006, the CCP launched the “eight glories and eight disgraces (八榮八耻)” campaign. This is aimed at promoting compliance among the population and it was at least partly designed to be learnt about by rote by schoolchildren. This is how to be a good Communist today. Here are the eight of both:

1. It is glorious to adore the fatherland; it is a disgrace to harm the fatherland;

2. It is glorious to serve the people; it is a disgrace to disserve the people;

3. It is glorious to respect science; it is a disgrace to be ignorant and unenlightened;

4. It is glorious to work hard; it is a disgrace to be indolent;

5. It is glorious to promote unity and mutual help; it is a disgrace to be self-seeking;

6. It is glorious to be honest and trustworthy; it is a disgrace to be mercenary and profit-grabbing;

7. It is glorious to be disciplined and law abiding; it is a disgrace to violate laws and disciplines;

8. It is glorious to be willing to struggle; it is a disgrace to be sybaritic.

The next post will be on the rural issues that continue to plague China (and CCP responses).

The 80s and early 90s (an overview of Deng Xiansheng's later years)

In the 80s the children destined for the universities had been moulded by their schools to be ‘red’ and yet increasingly they were being influenced by Western ideas and dissatisfied with their low potential incomes in this period of a China in as much flux as in Mao’s time (if in the opposite direction in a sense). They began to question the idea of Communism itself, in these conditions. They began, too, to seek the changes that they wanted.

This is really what produced such a ‘culture fever’ (along with the stultification brought about by the so-called CR). Now was clearly the time to examine the culture. Now it was really possible, as free from repression as the Chinese had ever really been in China.

This was really, of course, mainly a phenomenon of the university system and this was still the system of the ruling classes. Fang told the students what they really thought they already knew (that the Communist system and Marxism were out-of-date) but he drew a wide following for doing it, all over China. He lectured on freedom and democracy all over. Meanwhile in the relative party centre Hu Yaobang proved to be a man of the people in a way most senior CCP officials of the time were not. He also sympathised more with both the plights and ideas of the masses than the others did.

In December 1986 many of the students of Hefei, Beijing and Shanghai declared in demonstrations that they had had enough and demanded freer elections (remember the 1980 experiment and its roll-back in 1986). This resulted in a number of incidents of beatings by police. In Shanghai alone, more than 30,000 students had protested with the support of many of the local population and this probably should have given someone a clue.

In defiance of the threat of beatings, students in Beijing continued their protests until 1 January 1987 and marched on Tiananmen Square where the police were ready. They had apparently watered the square so that the resulting ice would be treacherous for the students and make it easier for the police to knock them over.

They duly knocked them over while Hu publicly defended them. For his trouble he in turn was duly (and publicly) ousted by means of a specially advertised Chinese Central Television (CCTV) announcement. The repression of others including Fang soon followed in an orchestrated campaign. At the centre Zhao, the other Deng ‘puppet’, took over Hu’s lead party role, then, leaving his premiership to Li Peng.

Zhao and Li then had plenty of economic problems to deal with and one measure meant to alleviate some of them, the new ‘one child’ policy, first announced in 1979, was causing problems of its own.

The policy was neither well received nor well enforced in this period in the countryside. Farmers still needed sons to provide for them in their decrepitude and it was not legal to abort girls. Nevertheless there was a degree of enforcement. Police sometimes escorted recalcitrant women (still trying for an elusive boy) to hospitals to have their fallopian tubes compulsorily tied.

With Decollectivisation and ‘opening’ had come rural unemployment together with the increase in wealth in the SEZs that furthermore were at first mostly concentrated in the south – the north was getting a somewhat raw deal. The ‘iron rice bowl’ in the cities was causing problems because it had the effect of being a disincentive for hard work. The final main issue was the inflation that became problematic in 1988.

The leaders were more frank about these problems than Mao had perhaps ever been but the people were unimpressed by mere candour. At the same time there weren’t really many legal protest avenues.

With Hu’s death in 1989 the Beijing students were finally moved to bring their concerns to the government in the only ways they knew how: demonstrating in the square and presenting a petition outside Hu’s official funeral that took place as I mentioned in an earlier post in the Great Hall of the People.

This petition idea of course hails back to the time of the emperors and is part of a centuries-old tradition. Untraditionally the petitions were snubbed although perhaps it’s reasonable to say that a funeral probably wasn’t an appropriate time or place to present a petition. Nevertheless the petitioners gave the petition-giving attempt quite a traditional flavour and the snubbing, regarded as arrogant by many, was therefore a spur to further righteous protest with more people involved.

On 26 April the party had been sufficiently irked to proclaim via a People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao) editorial that the student movement was ‘turmoil’ – there were shades of a suggested return to the CR and Red Guards in that accusation with all the attendant opprobrium hinted at. In the past this might have cowed the students but in their already heated condition this time it merely angered them. The police seemed powerless (or perhaps unwilling) to suppress this protest movement.

So protest continued and to add insult to injury, as far as Deng was concerned, the day before Gorbachev was due to arrive in Beijing to officially consolidate a ‘thaw’ in Sino-Soviet relations (and when the world’s press were gathered to record that auspicious event) some of the students began a very inauspicious hunger strike. Also students for all over China (not to mention many Beijing workers from all parts of Beijing) were beginning to descend on Tiananmen Square to amplify the public insult.

Zhao was conciliatory and in these circumstances that led to his own immediate ouster. He and other leaders had met with student leaders (including hunger strikers clearly impaired from their physical ordeals) but all of these meetings had ended up being confrontational, such was the mood of the times.

The mood for radical change never caught on in the countryside, however (however affecting the scenes of emaciated striking students undoubtedly were) and this was a key factor in allowing the party to have a free hand in dealing with the movement. The day after Zhao’s ouster, martial law was declared.

Although at first the PLA moved slowly the crackdown was ultimately heavy. It occurred on the evening of 3 June and the morning of 4 June. At least 2,000 supporters of the students were probably killed on the streets surrounding the square attempting to defend it. The students themselves were mostly able to flee and flee they did. Some of their leadership were able to flee the country and the other known leaders were ultimately arrested.

International initial reaction was quite swift. Governments around the world condemned the PRC government’s violent suppression of the movement. Many Western companies and governments scaled down their operations within China.

Deng’s reaction to the reaction was unrepentant, however. As he evidently expected, the international mood was soon able to be restored to more or less its former state quite rapidly as, internationally, China was as needed as it needed.

China was soon to enter a period of unprecedented growth with international support that Deng began to explicitly promote again as soon as in 1992 in his “Copy Shenzhen [SEZ]” campaign following from his tour of various areas he decided were worthy of being copied including the Shenzhen SEZ. His lead role indicated a return to power of the reformist faction that the events of 1989 had only briefly discredited.

The politics of Asian values were already in evidence as the government was able to draw on local prejudice and nationalist sentiment to assert that foreign human rights concerns were really disguised Western imperialism re-packaged. The added advantage was a new kind of regional solidarity now available after the end of the Cold War that was able to be nurtured based on defence against alleged Western threats (especially the threat of US hegemony in Asia) allegedly merely disguised as human rights activism.

In the meantime, Deng gave the following expression to his ongoing faithfulness to both socialist doctrine and Dengism that can serve as his last word in this history:

If we don’t persevere with socialism, don’t reform and open up, don’t develop the economy, don’t improve people’s livelihoods, then this can only be the road to death.