Arabia

Returning now to where it all began, Arabia, Yemen is the only republic there today and also the only state not facing the Persian (Arabian in Arabic) Gulf and finally the only essentially non-oil state. All the other states are dynastic monarchies (with the exception in a sense of United Arab Emirates being a federation of monarchies formally led ex officio by the Emir of Abu Dhabi as president (ra’is)). Kuwait is an emirate, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are kingdoms and Oman is a sultanate.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is really where it all began containing as it does the cities of Mecca and Medina, is also probably the most conservative of the states and is certainly the biggest geographically. Three factors are of course pre-eminent in the story of ‘modern day’ Saudi Arabia: religion and tribalism (dating from the 18^th Century beginning of the Saudi ruling dynasty) and oil (significant since the 20^th Century).

The religious force was epitomised by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, an intolerant and puritanical 18^th Century Nejdi preacher, scholar and jurist in the school of the 9^th Century Hadith scholar/jurist, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. Wahhab was opposed to Sufism, Shi’ism and popular forms of veneration. His supporters were atavistic Salafis mainly living in the Nejd (literally “high plateau”) region of what is now Saudi Arabia, the largest town in the region being what is now Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh. Their style has been to ensure that the external forms of Islam are properly adhered to as practiced by the idealised earliest Muslims without much concern for the interior personal life of religion or understanding of the undoubted flaws of many of those, effectively worshipped, ancestors, though they would probably be horrified to hear themselves described in such a way, hating venerations as they do. Correct practice was for them virtually everything of importance in life.

The tribal force was the Saud family which became Wahhabi in the 18^th Century. They came from the Aanaza confederation and Rabi’a clans distinct from the Adnan of the Hijaz and the tribes of Yemen. While the alliance with Wahhabi ideology was constant, the Saud family was twice removed from their position of political domination of central Arabia before the father of the last several kings of Saudi Arabia, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud, finally regained control and created Saudi Arabia in the early to mid 20^th Century. The well known Muhammad ‘Ali of Egypt was involved in one of the crushings of the family at the behest of the Ottomans. The Sauds now have legitimacy as a ruling family by virtue of their Wahhabism and since their conquest of the Hijaz by virtue of serving as rulers over the two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. As his landholdings increased in the course of his conquests of most of the Arabian peninsula over about two decades, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz upgraded his status in turn from Emir to Sultan to King (Malik). He had well over a hundred sons and many daughters to his many wives.

Oil was the third powerful factor and it has contributed to the further success of the other two elements: the family (especially within Saudi Arabia) and Wahhabism (supported by petrodollars around the Islamic world). It was first prospected for near the peninsula by the British and Dutch (occasionally jointly) in Iran and Iraq. The first prospecting in Saudi Arabia, however, was undertaken by Americans who had managed to win the trust of the Saud family. They ultimately controlled the concessions on Saudi oil fields and the necessary pipelines with Arabian partners as ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company).

The social and economic effects of the development of the oil resources were not evenly spread in the kingdom at first. On the East coast, where the oil tended to be concentrated, an influx of foreign oil workers from all over the world had an especially early impact. As time went on, the effects were more evenly spread as the government generally discouraged nomadism and agriculture and promoted urban settlement throughout the kingdom. The now settled former pastoralists and farmers were thus made and became dependent upon government handouts made possible by oil wealth and were thus able to be more efficiently managed by the political and religious elites. Ironically, while the payouts have not always been equitable, as a result of oil wealth there are no ‘taxpayer dollars’ involved in the way we mostly understand them in the West and complaints (along with calls for democracy) are thus seen as less legitimate. This is the so-called Rentier State syndrome.

The kingdom does have an appointed Consultative Assembly which is not however a legislative body and is not permitted to criticise the government, it may only advise the government. The family also has a council which decides upon family matters such as succession from brother to brother since the first king’s death (and once decided to effectively depose a king, Saud Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, who agreed to abdication in 1964 and ultimately was in exile for life).

Oil and wealth resulting from oil as well as the position of Mecca and Medina have contributed to this tribal, conservative religious kingdom playing a considerable role internationally. The US is interested in defending Saudi oil in a way it never has been with Australian Uranium for which we may possibly be grateful. Could the reason be an attitude of post-colonialism that applies only to presumed inferior ‘races’? Repercussions arising from this directly may include the world epoch making 9/11 attacks as many Saudis find the US presence in their country so offensive and a small proportion no doubt subscribe to a tendency for radical reaction. The reaction in turn of the Saudi government is to focus attention on the prestige of the guardianship of the two holiest cities of Islam. Beyond that prestige, the Saudis have also sought to spread their ‘brand’ of Islam far and wide throughout the Islamic world by means of its largesse in spending its convenient ‘petrodollars’ which ironically come mainly from the US, one of the very sources of the legitimacy problems of the Saudis today.

The emphasis has had successes. Prestige has as a result grown, as indicated by the two million pilgrims that today visit Mecca each year at the time of the (lunar) annual hajj month alone. The Saudis only took over the mantle of rule of the Hijaz early in the 20^th Century. The informal Ottoman positions of Sharif and King of the Hijaz were not permitted to continue as a distinct governorship from those later established by Saudi Arabia after the 1924 abdication of King Hussein and the defeat and exile of his son, ‘Ali, the older brother of King Faisal I of Iraq and (later) King ‘Abdullah I of Jordan. At that time, and in the recent past, the pilgrimage was a small source of revenue and a concomitantly small cost to any state. In the 1830s, the Swiss Orientalist, John Burckhardt, a secret non-Muslim witness of one pilgrimage, had predicted its imminent demise as a Muslim rite in view of the small numbers then involved. Incidentally, some credit Burckhardt with having ‘discovered’ oil in the region (meaning probably that he was made aware of its existence by locals). The government today bravely bears a now large cost and Saudi businesses also benefit from much revenue as the government benefits from huge prestige as a result of its handling of the pilgrimage.

Much prestige has fallen upon Wahhabism, too, however, and sections of the Wahhabi (and Salafi) movement as well (arguably a major export of Saudi Arabia supported by American ‘petrodollars’) are sympathetic with the aims of ‘Usama Bin Laden. This embarrassing situation for the government has resulted in a crackdown on sympathisers with ‘terrorism’ since 9/11. On a single occasion recently, over a hundred Imams were officially purged. Wahhabism is certainly potentially open as an ideology to assertion of political control by leaders such as Bin Laden in the name of Islam and violence.

While a few titles in the West have considered the scenario of the fall of the house of Saud, it appears to have secured itself power indefinitely by means of a web of family alliances throughout government and society (as the Ba’ath Parties have in other countries – certainly in Syria). It has been suggested that the armed forces may stage a coup. Saudi Arabia has both a regular army and a “National Guard” arguably to ensure that very stability, even in the unlikely event that a family member or other person with the support of only one of the ‘armies’ steps out of line and attempts to take power unconstitutionally. The period of Arab military coups appears to have passed into history for the time being however a palace coup by a family faction, as I noted above, achieved the effective deposition of King Saud in 1964 and a revolution is never completely out of the question. The current King is ‘Abdullah. Traditionally, he will be succeeded by a prominent brother decided by the family council. The current heir apparent (referred to as the Crown Prince) is as a result Crown Prince Sultan but he is roughly the same age as his brother, the king (i.e. in his 80s). Proponents of democratic reforms and democratic socialism (usually Western educated) are somewhat tolerated.

A religious police force actively enforces a very strict level of physical sex segregation. A classic case of excess in this regard was perpetrated recently by even the regular police. As a fire raged at a school, young female people were not allowed to leave the scene as they could not access the correct clothing to ‘properly’ cover themselves and, probably consequently, burned to death. The results of these kinds of excess, while not necessarily intentional, are effectively satirised on local TV, however. One example involved a burglar being effectively the only legitimate head of a household due to having been male and having entered a house in which there were only female occupants. The females therefore required his permission to leave the house, a requirement enforced by the police who arrived at the scene. Women famously aren’t generally permitted to drive a car in Saudi Arabia although they may obtain permits in nearby states. Universities have separate male and female campuses generally in different neighbourhoods and women may generally only communicate with male academic teachers by electronic means or by sending male relatives as proxies. The female campuses have nearly a full complement of female academic staff, however, providing extra job opportunities for many educated women in academia.

The strict rules have also produced a clandestine culture of pre-marital meetings organised simply in order to get to know a possible future spouse before marriage. As a rule, the eastern provinces tend to be less strict in maintaining these rules that the Nejd or Hijaz, predominantly as a result of exposure to the cultures of foreigners working in the eastern oil fields and subsidiary industries there. Even the royal family is believed to engage in non-Wahhabi-approved activities in private. As discussed above, however, this is less of an issue than one might imagine, focused as Wahhabism is on external appearances and correct practice in public rather than what may be purely private ‘peccadilloes’. There is a Shi’a presence in this kingdom whose basis is in part a religious view of the Shi’a as quite as evil as any other ‘non-Muslim perversion’. If Shi’a people are able to not flaunt their religion, and if they are needed in Saudi Arabia’s economy, they are tolerated.

‘Unayzah is an example of a middling and middle class city in Saudi Arabian terms. Both the formation of the Saudi state and the discovery of oil have had significant effects in this city and not necessarily all positive. Around the turn of the 20^th Century it was already described as the “Paris of the Nejd” and it has been described with admiration at various times by at least several Europeans, Amin al-Rihani and the first king, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Saud, himself. It has perhaps not surprisingly therefore seen a relative decline as the rest of Saudi Arabia has been developed rapidly and become somewhat more centralised in focus around nearby (and now flourishing) Riyadh. Its middling nature perhaps makes it a reasonable example of how Saudi Arabian society has fared recently and the Saudi scholar Soraya Altorki perhaps chose it as a subject of her study in the mid 1980s for that reason and also perhaps because of its interesting early 20^th Century ‘notoriety’ and subsequent virtually inevitable reduction in relative importance.

Altorki notes the emergence of a new class of women with a different external relationship with men (the non-Saudi worker) but also the development of a sense of independence of income in Saudi women (as well as men) as traditional roles are updated to analogous roles in a relatively individualised and modern milieu. She notes, though, that the state itself remains an essentially male organisation. With regard to educational advancements, she noted that, while advances were staggered so that boys and young men were given the earliest assistance in furthering their educational attainments, the education levels of girls and young women were also advancing. A catch-up is thus occurring. Fathers (though still patriarchs of their families and thus rulers over the affairs of their daughters) have also tended to be supportive of the right to work of their daughters in the negotiation of the marriage contracts of their daughters (in which requirements in relation to such affairs may be stipulated). Some men expressed mild concern that their wives were able to earn more than they were able to earn in the new wage economy. Women were limited by not being able to drive or even independently use the modern forms of public transport now becoming available. At the same time, the prized genealogies of the Arabs of the region are now beginning to include more women, probably indicating an improved status.

The Saudis are today seriously considering their position post-oil in a modern world and the project of producing mega-cities today is part of a serious attempt to produce the basis for a viable post-oil economy. Reform (on an Islamic basis) to the polity is also occurring especially following the public and Islam-based nasiha protests of 1991. In 2005, municipal elections were held coinciding with the coming to power of King ‘Abdullah that women, however, were not permitted to vote in. Along with today’s economic reforms, there are some improvements in the conditions of women. The state recognises the state of Israel and has interests that coincidence to some degree with those of the USA. The limited Hanbali Ahl al-Hadith (Hadith scholarship) view of the law still inhibits legal growth in Saudi Arabia, Ibn Hanbal the Hadith scholar being the only founder of a major legal school in Islam who was not actually a jurist by formal training. As oil and pilgrimage have been major sources of Saudi wealth, the Saudis have been focused on the external and the large foreign workforce has contributed further to the many cross-currents operating there. Whether this interplay of currents and this external focus contributes to the success of Saudi Arabia today and into the future or is a weakness that is damaging and will damage it as suggested by the ‘purists’ (such as ‘Usama bin Laden) remains to be seen.

The Other States of Arabia

Generally for all of the Gulf countries I will discuss now, which all benefited from oil wealth (and for Saudi Arabia), their main pre-oil revenues were earned in the traditional pearling industry. Some Arab pearlers originating in the Gulf even operated in Sri Lanka. A politically powerful pearl merchant class somewhat distinct from the ruling classes therefore existed which provided a counterfoil to the ruling families who grew wealthy due to oil. As a result, although notably not in Saudi Arabia, there are relatively democratic styles of rule in many of these countries. One possible irony is that the current modernisations have generally resulted in a setback for women. Part of the reason for this is that women did have a productive role in the traditional economy which has become irrelevant in the modern economy leading to a concomitant loss of status. While men also lost their traditional roles, the forces of patriarchy together with a conservative form of Islam (especially in Saudi Arabia) have preserved male power and brought about both the segregation and veiling of the modern and now inactive Arabian woman. Female foreign workers are not so restricted, as they have a valued modern productive role.

There is also competition among these small states for prestige which may explain the attempts to stand out in the Arab world as a whole but especially in the Gulf discussed below. They compete for a range of businesses and especially to have major airport infrastructure, media outlets and conferences (think Doha in Qatar). The populations tend to be both sophisticated and respectful of their cultural traditions (as Western sophisticates tend to be also). All of the countries have large numbers of expatriates of other countries residing there (and forming a majority in the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain).

The countries all tend to face several common limitations on their indigenous economic capacities. Shortages of arable land, water and skilled indigenous agriculturalists limit the feasibility of agriculture and food production, shortages of skilled workers limit industry and have produced reliance upon foreign expatriates and the nature of the rentier state and other factors have limited the efficiency of administration. It may well prove to the benefit of each of the Gulf States (as indeed for the Arab states as a whole) for the states to combine in all these areas for their mutual benefit. Localist interests make this unlikely to occur in the near future, however. The establishment of a more defined rule of law in these countries (as, too, in Saudi Arabia) would also certainly contribute to an improved investment climate there.

Kuwait is an independent Emirate that was created by British action to be independent as much as any other British creation in the region. This explains, to an extent, the forceful claim to it made by Saddam Hussein that led to the First Gulf War in which America was a direct belligerent in 1991. Kuwait is also ‘punching above its weight’ in Arab cultural terms today and considering a democratic system.

Bahrain is an island off the east coast of Arabia.

Qatar is the home of the al-Jazeera television network.

The United Arab Emirates is the home of two major airlines, Emirates and Etihad. Dubai (one of the Emirates) is establishing itself as a major world financial centre.

Oman is known especially to history as a great Arab maritime trading power in the India to Africa trade and established many small colonies in Africa largely for the purpose whose culture consequently survives there. Most of the population today practice the fairly rare Khawarij version of Islam but prefer not to use that term. A small part of the state is separated from the rest today for historical reasons by the United Arab Emirates.

Yemen has recently attracted attention as the place of learning and inspiration of the recent underpants bomber.

Reform (by Nasiha?) in Saudi Arabia?

In 1973, Talal Asad likened the internal debate within Islam in contemporary Saudi Arabia to similar, sometimes violent, debates which occurred in Europe in earlier times. Nevertheless, he stresses that historical circumstances are not necessarily strictly comparable. In Saudi Arabia, for example, two families, one more religious and the other more secular, have engaged in a somewhat successful partnership in a quickly modernising economy and society, which, unlike Europe, has the example of both Europe and Islam available for its edification. Despite the duality of families, he claimed, there has been no neat division between ‘Mosque and state’ in the area of politics.

He suggests that Muslim-dominated polities have always maintained a tradition of peaceful criticism of government and Muslims in general each Friday in the khutba and that this has recently been supplemented in Saudi Arabia by the traditional critics, a group of junior ‘ulama (similar to the junior clergy), and modern critics, by means of two petitions to the king, the former (from the 'ulama) in religious terms and the latter in terms of secular rights and interestingly much more deferential but both arriving at similar recommendations for the Saudi government.

The reasoning which led to the first petition was the Muslim concept of providing respectful and loving advice to the ruler as in the khutba (the Nasīha tradition I mentioned in an earlier post). In the case of this petition, the writers evidently felt they had a duty rather than a right to present it and senior ‘ulama did not dispute that duty. They did argue that the petition should not have been published (as it was), however. The junior ‘ulama responded (publicly again) that there were precedents for publishing petitions.

While we might consider this process of subjection of religion to political considerations in a modernising society a necessarily violent one as it was in the West, Asad suggested that the Saudis have been thus managing the transition (adapting ideas developed first in the West) relatively peacefully (ironically in very public discussions about the need to keep discussions private).

The Saudi reform process slowly continues relatively un-noticed in the West. It could hardly do otherwise.

More of the Debate within Islam and its spillages

Political Islamic thinkers may be divided into three categories: progressives, Islamists open to dialogue and ahistorical Islamists closed to dialogue and debate. The last category may also be subdivided into violent and non-violent. Waleed ‘Ali’s People like Us provides insight into the questions that appear to divide the West from Islam. There are more useful ways to consider political Islam over the last 50 years, say, besides considering it unchanging and uniform. For instance, we can see political Islam as a variety of highly evolved movements and specifically designed for each situation in which people in the Islamic world find themselves, politically. As I have also noted in earlier posts, even within a given movement there are always a variety of tactical and even strategic ideological views.

One kind of political Islam we may consider is a political movement violently opposed to its national government as the FIS was for many years in Algeria. The degree of violence employed is not constant over time especially as governments demonstrate their willingness to change their stripe but also as elements of the movement becomes weary of violence (especially when their own violence is directed against an ostensibly Islamic government).

There are also movements which are essentially nationalist but use Islamic terminology such as those in the southern Philippines, Aceh and Kashmir. These movements are persistent for reasons other than Islam and may prove highly volatile as nationalist ideology rarely concedes the autonomy of national territory to an alleged other nation.

The Brothers (Ikhwan) groups are an example of social or cultural movements that developed politically especially under the repressive influence of brutal government regimes. I’ve mentioned that in Jordan they now have an established party, the Islamic Action Front, and a degree of government tolerance exists. Their electoral support for the time being has maximised there at about 30% partly due to failure to fully articulate coherent policies and partly due to government action. In Egypt, the Party of the Centre (Hizb al-Wasit) is a moderate splinter group from the Brethren which also suffers from political wishy washiness.

Both the Jamati Islami in Pakistan and Turabi’s National Islamic Front in Sudan began in similar fashion to the Brethren but experienced a period in power by virtue of allying themselves with military dictators (Zia in the late 80s and Numeiri, also in the 1980s, respectively). They, in turn, gave their Islamic imprimatur to the dictators. In both cases, the US played a role in both initially supporting the dictators and later supporting their ultimate overthrow. Particularly in Pakistan, women’s rights were significantly curtailed under Zia but the Jamati Islami was far from the worst enemy of women in Pakistan. These movements model oppositionist Islam giving relatively disenfranchised people private social services and the opportunity for a protest vote against illiberal governments but generally without providing a serious political programme that might inspire the confidence they would need to in order to actually form government for the long haul.

The next class we might consider is resistance movements that have developed a political programme and been elected to represent an occupied people, the classic case being Hamas. Formed in 1987 during the first intifada from the remnants of weak and relatively secularist Brotherhood and other resistance movements in Israeli-occupied Palestine, hard times eventually led to a turning to religious inspiration. While it is an Islamic group, Hamas is also supported by many Palestinian Christians because of its anti-occupation agenda and relative absence of corruption when compared with the PLO. Its less violent agenda than Islamic Jihad (mainly based in Gaza) is politically appreciated in Palestine.

I’ve discussed the potential for political and paramilitary splinter groups to be formed by the action of repression in earlier posts and Hamas falls somewhat into this category (if it is on the mild side, ideologically and politically, when compared with other groups such as Islamic Jihad, al-Qaeda, etc.)

There are significant radicalised splinter groups formed usually from younger cadres of less radical groups in at least Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq and various countries of South East Asia. Members are typically withdrawn from the societies into small close-knit subgroups in which they live in preparation for violent jihad. The names of the groups are generally innocuous-sounding such as Islamic Group but may occasionally be threatening with terms such as Jihad. The group in Syria with the name Tawhid, for example, whose name is uncontroversial in Islam, simply meaning unity referring to God’s Oneness, is certainly a radical splinter group. The Lebanese group called Victory of Islam (Fatah al-Islam), perhaps a slightly threatening name, is apparently an al-Qaeda affiliate which certainly qualifies it as violent and radical. The Sunni Brotherhood has been rather weak in majority Shi’a Iraq but the Jaish al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army or Army of the Wise One or Army of the Anointed One) qualifies as a radical Shi’a group there, radicalised by civil war and occupation. The Badr Organisation (Munathamat Badr) formerly known as the Badr Brigades is another example of radical Shi’a Islam in Iraq. Badr refers to a major battle in very early Islam and also means full moon. The Shi’a Islamic Da’wa (Call) Party’s name refers simply to the call to religion from God but the party, which is now a conservative party in Iraq’s new democracy, was earlier a banned and radicalised splinter party (by suppression during Ba’ath Party rule from its formation in the late 1960s or perhaps earlier). Today the party still appears to be splintered into the Islamic Da’wa Party and the Islamic Da’wa Party/Iraq Organisation. The Indonesian/South East Asian Jama’a Islamiyya was of course responsible for the major Bali bombing and other atrocities.

On the other hand the reforming king of Morocco (who chooses to wear the fez popularised by the Ottomans who never ruled Morocco) has recently set up a school for female imams.

Of all the male ideologists I have considered in various posts, there is a wide variety of attitudes to the wearing of beards and western styles of dress. There are also a wide variety of attitudes to sacrifice for the cause. Muhammad Akef of the relatively peaceful Egyptian Muslim Brothers leadership has spent more time behind bars than Nelson Mandela. Ghannoushi of Tunisia breaks the mould of political Islam by having a political preference for definite, achievable programmes.

Lest we forget how different the various ideologists were in their proposals and fall for the idea that political Islam is one united force against the West, I would now like to briefly note how some of the most widely respected thinkers differed.

Maududi saw Islam as the best religion and all-encompassing so that it provided all necessary legal and constitutional measures. The prime duty of any good state for him was to protect Islam, command what Islam commands and prohibit what Islam prohibits.

Qutb on the other hand saw Islam as a great, just, all-encompassing way of life for Muslims from which good government would flow in Muslim nations but saw that Europe was entitled to follow the secular path.

Afghani was a Muslim nationalist but he was also a fan of science up to a point. He was not a huge fan of the established clergy of Islam, however, but he saw Islam as the potential heart of the only just philosophy.

Taha Hussein, however, was a different kind of nationalist. He was an Egyptian nationalist who also saw Egypt as properly a part of Western and Mediterranean Civilisation rather than Eastern Civilisation. He was a member of the ulema not especially liked by Afghani but was ironically less Islam-focused than Afghani himself was.

As with Qutb and Maududi, both Afghani and Hussein were interested in discussion of the West and its ideas.

Khomeini was pro-theocracy and anti-Jew and saw Islam as a perfect constitutional form in itself.

Al-Banna, on the other hand, didn’t envisage an especially constitutional/theocratic role for Islam. He was rather more interested in creating social and cultural progress and would have been relatively happy with a fair degree of secularisation as long as Western materialism was guarded against and Islam was duly considered as a political model.

On the other side of the ledger in Islam is a writer, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq, who opposed any return to a caliphate (having witnessed the end of a weak and corrupt alleged one at the end of the Ottoman period) thus falling foul of the Egyptian king, who at that time was considering appropriating the title for his own purposes, and consequently losing his job as a Sharia judge and al-Azhar academic. He also suggested that generally Islam permitted Muslims some flexibility in their choice of political system and even leaned towards a democratic one perhaps similar to some of the democracies in the West. He stressed that the monarchy of Muhammad was a special case as he was a prophet and that the Qur’an was a moral guide rather than a book of legal and constitutional rules.

Nazira Zein ed-Din is another Islamic writer (also writing in the 1920s) who represented a particular Islam; the Islam that includes women's rights. She was a Lebanese writer who proposed that women unveil in line with the mood of those times in much of the former Ottoman Empire. Fatima Mernissi has continued her work in a time when that mood has reversed in many areas. These authors have also dealt with other women’s issues in similarly progressive ways, considering the times in which they operated (and continue to operate in the case of Mernissi) though much of the ‘progress’ has been opposed or met with arguments for traditional practices that resonate with many Muslims including the authors themselves. The arguments concerning veiling rightly continue in many places in the Middle East but legally enforced dress codes only apply in the Gulf States, Iran (where veiling is generally compulsory in public places) and Turkey (where veiling continues to be prohibited in certain places). Unfortunately, however, social pressure continues to limit freedom of choice in this area in many places.

The influence of Hadith Studies in keeping the Islamic World ‘Backward’

Before I begin this post I want to make a little excuse for my posts of the last few weeks in particular and this one. I have been dissatisfied with many of them but have been unable or unwilling to edit them properly because of carpal tunnel syndrome. For the same reason I'm taking a week off after this post to allow my wrist to recover.

That's a fairly provocative post title and it also signals that I'm now going to link the studies that originated with the time of Muhammad and the political ideas that first circulated then (but carried on into modern times) with modern times under ideological and other domination by the West. So really this is about how certain strands of Islam have proved not to be useful in moving beyond a mediaeval mind-set to face modern realities.

Modern Islamic thinkers are generally concerned to deemphasise the legal importance of the Hadith and Qur’an to the extent they have been used to inhibit the use of ijtihad (legal reasoning). Notable exceptions to this recent understanding of Islam as a moral rather than a legal/constitutional force include the recent Iranian, al-Qaeda and Taliban ideologies although some of these ideologies are in dialogue with modernity as they must be.

Debate will continue as to how literally or how interpretively to deal with questions in Islam using very old sources of ‘law’ in much the same way there continues to be legal debate in the West concerning ‘activism’ among judges. Al-Shafi’i and Ibn Hanbal were early exponents of the literalist camp in early Islam. They held that the Hadith ought to cover matters not explicit in the Qur’an thus obviating the need for excessive interpretation. In response to this approach, which tends to have resulted in excessive legalism, modern scholars note the emphasis which the prophet himself placed on principles rather than formalised details.

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and Saudi Arabia

Wahhab lived from 1703 to 1791 in Central Arabia and he began a movement of religious revivalism and moral reform there. He received his earliest Hanbali clerical training in Eastern Arabia and more in the Hijaz, Syria and Iraq. He opposed the Enlightenment values that the Ottomans, who controlled parts of Arabia, had taken on.

He gave his personal bay’a to an Emir of the House of Sa’ud in 1744 and called himself Shaykh and the Emir, Imam. His descendents thus took the surname ash-Shaykh and continued to have an important relationship with the Sa’udi family which became the royal family of Saudi Arabia. His views are certainly in the Ahl al-Hadith tradition of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya. He opposed superstition and idolatry, which he saw as involved in the veneration of saints and their tombs; even the most sacred sites at Mecca and Medina were over-venerated in his view. Again, he followed Ibn Taymiyya in Salafiyya atavism. The upshot of that was that an ideal and true Islam could only be discovered in emulation of the main players in 7^th Century Arabia. He tended to overlook some of the flaws of these men and women and exaggerate their virtues. He opposed all non-Muslims and also Sufi and Shi’a Muslims, which he saw as idolatrous and/or manipulative, even more narrow-mindedly than Ibn Taymiyya. His ideas were also arguably quite derivative of Ibn Taymiyya rather than in any sense original and he regularly narrowly interpreted and selectively quoted from Taymiyya's work. This self-proclaimed Shaykh who inspired ‘modern’ Saudi Arabia essentially combined a tribal world view with patterns of puritanical Hanbali Islam that Saudi oil wealth has helped to export to much of the rest of the Islamic world today.

The Saudis ruled when they were able with the support of the Wahhabi Shaykh family from the time of that first agreement on. They were suppressed at various times by Ottoman troops at one time under the command of the Albanian, Muhammad ‘Ali, who ruled Egypt. Saudi rule has now been continuous in Saudi Arabia since ‘Abd al-'Aziz as-Sa'ud with the aid at first of a mere 40 odd warriors began to reassert his control in the early 20^th century, shortly before the finding of large quantities of oil in the territory. To date all of the kings who have succeeded him have been his sons (as is the current crown prince). The regime’s legal system was generally opposed to the use of ijtihad and its philosophy may be best described by itself on the occasion of the state’s 60^th Anniversary as a kingdom in London’s The Times as “progress without change”. Material progress has occurred along with no change permitted to attitudes or behaviour in any material respect according to the lights of the regime and its supporting clerics. Obviously this regime stance is a purely fantasist one. Attitudes are indeed changing as are behaviours. While no parties are allowed the Muslim Brothers are permitted to operate there and the Saudi regime has given substantial financial support to the Brethren in other Islamic countries arguably in order to destabilise those countries. The trial of Qutb which led to his execution apparently raised the support he received from Saudi Arabia. While attitudes and behaviour in private may be changing, public behaviour with which the regime does not agree remains dangerous. The problem for the general population remains that the regime’s oil wealth means it does not require the support of its people in the form of tax, one of the major reasons people usually give for justifying asking for representation in government.