1989 – Causes and Effects (Part Two – Effects)

The first effect of the movement (combined with the government attitudes I’ve mentioned in the last post) was, of course, that there was a massacre and a crackdown on the movement. What were the lessons learned and what was the aftermath of the crackdown, however?

The CCP learned the relative benefit of nipping any incipient protest movement quickly and decisively in the bud before it has the opportunity to elicit wider support. The party had allowed divisions at the head of the party to prevent decisive action being taken early enough and decided that this had been the prime cause of the undue magnitude of the eventual bloodshed required. The very early attention to the suppression of the Falun Dafa (or Falun Gong) movement can be viewed as a direct result of this new calculus.

At the same time the party also learned that it had lost the power to influence the views of large numbers of especially urban people merely by formally requiring them to think a certain way (if indeed it had ever truly possessed this power). In other words it would have to address concerns as they arose by correcting the problems (for example by rooting out complained-of corruption and dealing with inflationary pressures and relative poverty). ‘Dealing with concerns’ had the added benefit of further isolating such dissidents as proponents of the Falun Dafa and democrats.

Jiang Zemin was the man Deng brought in at this point to rebuild a grassroots party organisation that would be worthy of being listened to again. He also worked to make to economy work better (to isolate the democrats). The party was being conformed to the tastes of the leadership and not the other way around.

The rest of the world also learned something about China in 1989 and that was that this was not the end of history yet. China was not becoming like the West as quickly as some had imagined it was. They saw that an internationally engaged China remained illiberal for the time being and still lacked a basic concern for individual human rights in contrast to its recent more liberal image internationally. Deng had been named Time’s ‘Man of the Year’ in two separate years (1978 and 1985), to give an example of how sanguinely he had been widely viewed. The CCP was now again seen, then, as an unreconstructed authoritarian party and government by the Western mainstream media which had created the liberal benign image. Deng’s image was similarly tarnished although it must be said that many Western pundits had never actually bought what was now revealed to be the false image. He was now a dictator and China was uninterested in human rights. The mainstream media's pendulum had thus swung in the other direction and this view was perhaps equally unrealistic.

The other thing the West learned was that there was actually a large group of people in China possibly interested in something like western-style democracy.

The upshot of the crackdown internationally was that the West condemned it and China defended it. Until 1991 their official excuse was not an excuse at all but special pleading that it was an internal matter and thus no concern of anyone but the Chinese.

In 1991, however, an effort was finally made to publicly defend it. The party released a ‘white paper’ called Human Rights in China. In it the party made the claim that China was interested in human rights but that it had different priorities from the West. There were three strains to its formal argument:

1) Socialist - This strain has less credibility now than when it was written (when

China was still relatively less capitalist than it now is) and is therefore now deemphasised in the argument. The argument was along the lines that capitalist polities allocate rights according to class making equal rights in the West a bourgeois myth so rights under socialism are obviously more equal in reality making democracy and human rights guarantees unnecessary. The guarantee of the right to full employment was once a special pride of the CCP but such economic rights began to be eroded as early as in the 1979 labour market reforms. The problem with this argument was always that the facts never completely matched the theory in China in any case. There were always as wide disparities of income and opportunities in China as anywhere (the countryside was still especially poor at this time), which issues democracy, an independent judiciary and human rights guarantees might well be required to adequately address;

2) Developmental - These last two strands were of course the neo-authoritarian

arguments. The Chinese were not yet ready for political rights in this first developmental part. In the meantime, so the argument went, we are doing well at economic rights per the requirements of the 2^nd UN Covenant on Human Rights of 1966 (the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), which are more important in this stage of development. These rights (deemed collective rights) included the right to education, healthcare, a decent standard of living, community and social services, employment, equal pay for equal work, the maintenance of cultural traditions and security. Development that required authoritarianism now would both support economic rights and permit political and legal reform later in support of rights deemed individual rights provided for in the 1^st Covenant (on Civil and Political Rights). Opponents of this strand of the argument regard this as unconscionable cherry picking of rights as they say all rights are equally important (and also depend on each other for their strength) regardless of the level of economic development. They also reckon China should commit itself to a time certain (based on any development criteria) when all rights would be protected, if they want to play that game (and don’t believe an authoritarian government would be the best authority to decide on any timing of this in any case – they would probably never decide on it, they argued); and

3) Asian Values - Or possibly Chinese or East Asian or Confucian values. It’s yet

again that idea that some rights are more equal than others but this time not for reasons of underdevelopment. This time it’s for reasons of culture and East Asian context. Lee Kwan-Yew in Singapore, Suharto in Indonesia, Deng in China and Mahathir Mohammed in Malaysia first raised this argument more or less together in the early 1990s. Lee was the earliest and strongest advocate followed in rough order by Mahathir, Suharto and Deng.

Human rights agreements and international campaigns were a new form of Western cultural imperialism in this strand of the new Chinese argument and for the other proponents of the Asian Values view of rights. Historical, national, regional, religious, social, economic and cultural contexts needed to be considered more than they had been in formulating the rights. This position (of emphasis on family, community, stability, authority and development and avoidance of the alleged morally and socially decadent Western worship of the individual) was supported by 44 Asian governments in the Bangkok Declaration of 1993. The arguments against were basically that this is moral relativism with no other purpose but to justify a clearly unsatisfactory status quo that keeps rulers in their current positions of power, modernisation had rendered a lot of the argument meaningless and modern conditions required modern solutions to address potential abuses of power and corruption. The problem for this argument in turn was that it was Western, hypocritical and contained unrealistic and arguably imperialistic expectations. Needless to say, perhaps, the debate is ongoing.

1989 – Causes and Effects (Part One – Causes)

How then did the debates of the 1980s lead to the tragedy at Tiananmen in 1989 and is the debate ongoing or did it end there? Today the Chinese continue to debate how the international notion of individual human rights should apply in China if indeed it should at all (and that debate may be a more or less direct result of the Tiananmen massacre). This debate is mainly between China and some western countries but it also occurs within China. However first let’s go back to the 1980s and the various forces at work in that decade.

The reform faction was split in the 1980s and Deng’s inevitable occasional kowtowing to the conservative faction likely had this as its inevitable result. The period has been regarded as one of ‘bourgeois liberalisation’ by those who opposed the reforms. That meant China was looking too much towards western political as well as economic systems for answers to China’s problems. On the liberal wing was Fang Lizhi (now teaching in the US but then a professor of astrophysics and Vice President at a technology university in Anhui who also lectured about freedom and democracy to his students). His downfall was a cause celebre of the opponents of liberal ideas and consequently of those who believed in them. That was the way China was rolling. There was a heck of a lot of division after the partial liberalisation of the 1980 elections.

The 1986 elections proved crucial in cementing the divisions because the nature of their conduct constituted a real reversal of the liberalisation that had proved somewhat promising in 1980. They provoked Anhui students (many inspired by Fang) to demonstrate for more democracy and this movement spread to other cities including Shanghai (but apparently not Beijing) before it was suppressed. Troublemaking students were still able under the system that then obtained to be sent to far off provinces on work assignments as punishment and that occurred to some extent. Unfortunately for the authorities, however, the mere threat of that had the effect this time of simply spreading the ideas to the masses that had produced the discontent among the students.

Fang and others were scapegoated but the movement drew strength from that this time. Fang was given a research posting in Beijing (so, far away from his Anhui students but strangely closer to the centre of action than ever). He was also expelled from the party. Liu Binyan, an investigative journalist was also scapegoated.

This marked the beginning of a new ‘campaign against bourgeois liberalisation’ and it wouldn’t end until it had led to the fall of Hu Yaobang himself at the very apex of the party in 1987 (he was alleged to have been too sympathetic with and slow to suppress the original student protest movement). Hu, another prominent Xiangtanese, had argued within the Politburo against its suppression and it was evident that he did share some of its (and the students’) ideals. He was forced out as party general secretary and to write a traditional self-criticism and was replaced in that job by Zhao Ziyang, the Premier. That brought Li Peng into the position of Premier replacing Zhao.

Where did this now leave the party’s upper echelons? Deng, a cautious and old-school reformer, was still the paramount leader without portfolio but another perhaps more liberal reformer had been replaced for being too liberal. Li had obviously been vetted to ensure he wouldn’t be as liberal as Premier as Hu was as General Party Secretary.

Zhao had survived essentially because he was head of the ‘neo-authoritarian’ camp in debates concerning growth models and would be expected to carry this style of thinking into his new role. This camp in turn then had proponents among leaderships throughout East and South East Asia and based its ‘East Asian development model’ thinking on Confucianism. It had the basic ideas of subsuming individual interests into the collective interest of the society as determined by the authority (government should drive development) and that China was not yet ready for democracy as it interfered with the model’s social stability goal which would in turn interfere with the desired economic development goal.

Any protests, too, could potentially interfere with this economically valued stability and the Chinese (in taking the view that one role of government was the suppression of potentially injurious protests) were no orphans in their region. The stance was a combined cultural and economic claim that either or both of ‘Asian values’ (cultural claim) or the requirements of an underdeveloped economy (economic claim) required the suppression (by authoritarian government) of liberal democratic values in the name of these other social, political, cultural and economic values. On the other side were the ‘democrats’ who sought democracy now. And they were just the split views within the reformist faction. The Maoists were another story altogether when it came to authoritarianism.

So by 1989 what was it like to be a Chinese citizen?

As an economic citizen it was peachy keen in many respects. Freedom of choice quickly became substantially more evident both as a producer and as a consumer in the new market economy. Dynamism and pluralism existed here.

Intellectually, politically and culturally there was some room for debate but rights were limited and the neo-authoritarians were thoroughly in charge and not inclined to budge, believing as they did in what they were doing.

In the spring of 1989 three catalysts led to a feeling of the inevitability of righteous protest being in the air, however.

The first was the death of Hu on 15 April (so soon after his deposition for not completely suppressing a democratic protest movement quickly enough). That was followed on 4 May by the 70^th Anniversary of the establishment of the May Fourth Movement (a democratic movement) and on 15 May by the visit of the reformer Gorbachev (a believer in glasnost (‘openness’ – seen by many Chinese democrats as an introduction to democracy in a Communist system) as well as perestroika (economic restructuring)) for a Sino-Soviet Summit.

Hu had been a great hope of the democratic faction and his death was seen symbolically by some coming as it did so soon before a great anniversary regarded as so significant to Chinese Communism for so long by the CCP. Planning was well advanced for a variety of official celebrations of the anniversary. As well as being a crucible of the CCP, however, the May Fourth Movement had included calls for democracy. The Gorbachev visit was also intended to be and was seen as significant as it was intended to mark the first thawing of Sino-Soviet relations in nearly 30 years. The world’s media would be focused on Beijing for this significant visit making it also of special interest for protesters.

The first protests were by students outside Hu’s state funeral at the Great Hall of the People. This lit the touch paper for the protests on the latter two dates which took on lives of their own and the concept of hunger striking developed in mid May protests further galvanised and inspired the movement.

Given the above catalysts and inspiration, economic grievances also began to be aired by people besides democratic activists and students. People who admired the bravery of the hunger striking students began to notice that they perhaps had grievances worthy of protest, too, also related at least indirectly to the paucity of democracy. The economic reforms had produced great and apparent new disparities in wealth that weren’t appreciated by many people on the poor side of the disparity.

The division was between both the workers and their managers and between the public and new private sectors. It was not uncommon, for example, for a doctor in the state health system who had studied for many years to notice that s/he was receiving less income (potentially much less) that a street egg vendor. Also price deregulation and shortages in the market transition had led to an inflation rate of 20% that for many of the many poorer people hadn’t helped matters. The final concern with the reform was that the management of it had allowed scope for widespread corruption and widespread corruption there had been (families of CCP leaders were notably involved).

These issues were concerns especially in Beijing and other cities. Protests began to occur and gain widespread support in many cities. People hoped that democracy might produce both a more responsive and a less corrupt government that might fix these problems.