Showing posts with label people's liberation army. Show all posts
Showing posts with label people's liberation army. Show all posts

Thursday, November 10, 2011

The actual ‘Nuts and Bolts’ of the CR – the Schema

Mao had written many years before the official CR words to the effect that “a revolution is not a dinner party” and here he was about to prove this yet again. “Continuous Revolution” also required continuous chaos, rebellion and violence. I’m now considering the specific objectives as they were outlined and met in the fulfilment of Mao’s new CR strategy.

The first and really a proto-CR objective was the object of the PLA. It was to create the class (called “revolutionary successors”) that would meet the further objectives and it was met in the period 1963 to 1966. This involved the training of youth in the Mao cult. Maoists saw only the youth as completely trustworthy as they were considered untainted by pre-1949 society and ideas. The principal campaigns that were to inspire the ‘revolutionary successors’ were Mao’s socialist education campaign and the ‘learn from the PLA’ campaign.

Further, Maoists believed revolution must be “done” in order to be understood and so the youth would be encouraged to “do” it (as understanding revolution was deemed a good thing). They would “do” the CR and the principal first objects to have things “done” to them were revisionist backsliders within the CCP and their lackeys. Mao had no faith left in either most of the leadership of the party or the intelligentsia. Metaphorical calls were made to “bombard the headquarters” and who knew if they would ultimately have to be taken literally. With the successors now revved up, the “party” could now begin with the Red Guards as the hosts. The two clear objectives of the CR were to eliminate all revisionism and ‘smash’ the four olds and they were both to be accomplished in short order (in the period from August to December 1966). So the ‘capitalist roaders’ were to be identified, attacked and overthrown so that the real CR (the final elimination of all feudal and bourgeois cultural hangovers through ‘smashing the four olds’) could then happen unimpeded. The four olds included anything religious, traditional or Western. This was only phase one.

Next, people then had to put in to replace the deposed bureaucrats and this was essentially the next phase accomplished in 1967 and 1968. First in 1967 Red Guards and worker ‘rebels’ forcibly assumed control of all organisational and social units (mostly the factories and communes) and workers replaced the party structure with 1848 Paris Commune-style ‘workers’ and people’s committees’ that Commune having been so admired by Marx himself as a potential model. The overthrow of Shanghai city government was especially closely modelled on the history of that 'model' Commune. So admired was the Shanghai ‘coup’ that three of the people involved were later to form the Gang of Four with Mao’s wife. Workers assumed more of a role than the Red Guards here as it was their units being taken over. This was the period when Red Guards frequently began to fight each other. The final part of this phase occurred in July and August of 1968 and was carried out by the PLA. It was a reversal of the first two parts of the phase, as I’ve noted – the Red Guards and worker ‘rebels’ were finally suppressed themselves and sent down to the countryside for more education by work. This was actually the deadliest period as the PLA killed Red Guards on quite a large scale essentially because while they were much better armed and organised than the chaotic Guards forces the Guards still often refused to peacefully and meekly submit to PLA suppression.

The final phase was a kind of reversal of the first two which created power vacuums. It was about filling the vacuum and was accomplished by the PLA in August and September of 1968 and by the PLA and the CCP in 1969. The Paris Commune-like ‘mass organisations’ were replaced by PLA-dominated ‘revolutionary committees’ in 1968 that supported the rebuilding of the party and in 1969 the re-building of the party structure was then finally undertaken with the support of the PLA and the Shanghai radicals. The CR had reduced the ranks of those able to rebuild the party but the final outcomes of this phase were the decisions of the 9th party Congress in 1969 designed to present a show of unity to the outside world or to signal an end to further disputation.

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

More on the Origins and Theory of the CR

So it officially began in the early 60s with its most intense period in the mid to late 60s and had virtually petered out with the help of the PLA by the late 60s but let’s consider it some more. The official CCP position is that it was only ended with the death of Mao in 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four. Historians generally see it as lasting from around 1966 to 1969. But what was it?

The view of the party famously expressed in 1981 is that the CR was the “most severe setback” of the PRC, that “Mao was in error” in causing it and “confused the people with the enemy”. Essentially the claim is that the error was being confused about classes. The party still acknowledges the correctness of much of Mao’s original contribution to Marxism by taking the stand that his errors occurred in a finite period.

The view of the Belgian ANU Sinologist, Pierre Ryckmans (penname Simon Leys) is that it came down to a personal political conflict at the very upper echelons of the party. Harry Harding, another well known Sinologist, views it more as a struggle by Mao to be true to the revolution by seeking its continuation.

I will consider four factors that may explain its origins somewhat in some more detail: the political effects of the GLF, the political role of the PLA, the significance of how revisionism came to be defined and why it was thought that the issues of the day (essentially revisionism) needed to be and could best be dealt with by the CR. I’ll then do a bit of a brief and schematic outline of what actually happened in the next post (the form it all took).

We remember the waste of resources that the GLF involved. Exaggerations were produced in part by a general overconfidence and led (along with mild drought conditions) to shortages and a major humanitarian tragedy that was then capped off by the withdrawal of soviet support. Per capita grain production didn’t recover really until the mid to late 1970s.

Mao accepted some of the blame so that was the major political result along with the accession of Liu and Deng to relatively powerful positions and the return of soviet methods and incentivisation. Nevertheless Mao’s theory as a whole was not yet publicly rejected – his practice of the late 1950s was what was really deemed at issue – and that was an equally important political outcome to note when considering how the CR came about.

The main political role of the PLA in bringing about the CR was its contribution to the deification of Mao that I mentioned in an earlier post. Lin Biao had actually benefited directly from the ouster of Peng Dehuai (that I also noted earlier resulted from his well-meant critique of the GLF direct to Mao as a friend) as Lin took Marshall Peng’s place as Defence Minister.

One of the other things Lin produced that Mao approved was the 1963 “Learn from the PLA” campaign. A soldier called Lei Feng, who may not have actually existed, was the extremely selfless and heroic role model held up by the campaign. An alleged inspiring diary of his was ‘found’ and published after his alleged death and at least one movie was made about his alleged selfless and heroic exploits. Even martyrdom was what being a good socialist citizen called for evidently (shades of the spirit of Yan’an for those who’ve been paying attention). Lei was completely dedicated to Chairman Mao.

This was all tied in with the idea being promoted that Mao Zedong Thought (MZDT) would nurture ‘new’ people who would fit this mould and that everyone was but one tiny screw in the great socialist machine of the PRC. That was where the Mao cult, started spontaneously decades before but now enlarged and manipulated by the PLA, began to come into its own.

The ‘little red book’ was specifically edited to make Mao look infallible – traditional emperor worship was being replaced by Mao worship. Lin’s introduction lauded MZDT to the skies (“an inexhaustible source of strength and a spiritual atom bomb of infinite power”). Zhou also said in 1966 that effectively MZDT equals Truth – it was “the sole criterion for truth” (although he probably secretly leaned a bit on the side of Liu and Deng in relation to what was really truer, MZDT or other thinking, when it came to running a country – he was well practiced at keeping his secret leanings secret).

Now let’s get to revisionism, an orthodox Marxist theory that revolved around the expectation of backsliding of the socialist revolution into capitalist ways of thinking, and how fear of it contributed to the CR. It was feared socialism would thus be ‘revised’ leading to a new bourgeois class within the government and the entire system – even within the party structure. Mao’s view was that Khrushchev and the soviet leadership had begun to lead the Soviet Union down the revisionist road. In Mao’s theory people such as Khrushchev were bourgeois and ‘bad’ elements that had to be fought. In addition he saw that (misguided by the ‘bad’ soviet elements) China had begun policies that had produced such elements and that since the rise of Liu and Deng they had consequently assumed the vanguard of the party. This was how Mao explained the split with the Soviet Union and argued the need for further action (even within the CCP).

As Mao was slightly more than a figurehead at this time he was permitted to begin a new campaign called the Socialist Education Movement that took place in 1962 and 1963. The aims were stated to be countering the influence of bureaucracy and revisionism within the CCP. All cadres were intended to be individually examined to determine whether they were colluding in revisionism in any way. The party limited Mao’s campaign’s scope and sent ‘work teams’ to inspect the work of local officials. This attempt at attenuation (by Liu and Deng especially in order to protect themselves or so they hoped) was thwarted by the influence of the PLA that I’ve already outlined.

Mao saw renewed class struggle as inexorable and inevitable (and not to be attenuated) and of course, he saw himself on the side of the angels in that struggle. He thought a CR was needed to eliminate the old ideas and culture that in his view had led to the revisionism. He was thus looking over a precipice preparing to jump with the hope that he would reach the far side safely. How to control the CR was the issue for Mao. He thought that the support of the PLA and the people had virtually been secured so the time was probably as ripe as it was going to be. For him, as this was something he probably truly believed in, there was no option but to root out the revisionism (and hence institute a CR). In the new socialist ‘classless society’, Mao would attempt to have class defined by attitude. He had already begun the process in his theory of the permanent revolution and he now continued it with a new theory of ‘continuous revolution’ which envisaged not mere stops and starts but actual backsliding in the progress towards Communism.

Monday, November 7, 2011

From the Great Leap to the Cultural Revolution and beyond to the eventual demise of Mao


This post is another summary of PRC history (this time taking us from the first most widely recognised failure of Maoism to the last one and finally to its end as an unreconstructed CCP party policy with Mao’s death).
Mao’s extreme belief in voluntarism seems to have been reflected in the rather wildly optimistic Chinese economic forecasting of the 1950s. The CCP was fully expecting that China would be able to overtake Britain in industrial capacity within 15 years. As examples the predicted annual growth rates for the period 1955 to 1958 issued in the years 1955 and 1956 and in March 1958 as the Great Leap was commenced were revised upward dramatically with each new estimate. In 1955 in the first five-year plan as revised the predictions for industry and agriculture were 14.7 and 4.3 percent growth respectively. One year later as the second plan was being prepared, those figures had increased to 20.0 and 7.0 and by the time of the GLF in March 1958 they were a crazy 33.0 and 16.2.
As I’ve already suggested in an earlier post this kind of boosterism as I characterised it tended to produce an unrealistic atmosphere in which it seemed appropriate to misreport production: exaggerated targets produced exaggerated, unreliable reports, which then fed further distortions into the planning process.
The party organisation was made chaotic, the plans were undermined and a massive famine was the major result. Both the transportation and storage systems failed and the commune system contributed to massive wastage of resources. The grain harvest actually fell dramatically in the GLF years, 1958/59 to 1961, and estimates of the famine’s death toll range from 15 million to 45 million. In the period from 1952 to 1958 per capita grain tonnage had actually increased from around 0.325 tonnes to around 0.36 tonnes but had dipped to 0.26 tonnes by 1960 and didn’t recover to 1958 levels until around 1974.
A final result of this massive failure was Khrushchev’s order in July 1960, partly because he saw any further connection with the fiasco and a recalcitrant Mao as embarrassing, to withdraw all soviet assistance (experts fled China hurriedly, shredding blueprints as they went).
There were recriminations within the party in the early 1960s and even Mao resigned as head of state and chief economic planner in favour of his deputy, Liu. Mao had accepted some of the blame and Liu, Zhou and Deng began to reinstitute soviet-style planning infrastructure and to get the economy moving again.
Smaller scale agricultural collectives were re-established and small family plots (and small private incomes) were even permitted again. In the factories the use of material incentives for production that had fallen out of favour was also again in favour. At the same time, peasants and others who had been overworked for years were again allowed spare time.
Officially, though, everything was conveniently blamed upon the Russians (from whom the 1960 split had just occurred) and an actual significant drought.
Mao spent some of the early 1960s mainly studying Chinese classics and other works and partying at his dances (that he increased in frequency from once a week to twice a week) but by 1963 he yearned to return to power.
He was 70 years of age but still dreamed of Communism and believed that virtually he alone knew how (and truly wanted) to bring it about. He was still, of course, revered by the masses and a particularly important supporter in the early 1960s was Lin Biao, whom he had made Minister for Defence. In 1964, Lin arranged for the publication of a book of Mao quotations called “Quotations from Chairman Mao” that many know now as the ‘little red book’. This publication and the deliberate inculcation of children in a Mao personality cult contributed to a resurgence in Mao’s potential power base. The children were taught to revere and trust Mao.
Liu, Zhou and Deng may have felt this process weakened them but never felt able to directly resist it. The Mao cult may have also contributed to their own legitimacy (so long as they didn’t fall foul of Mao, publicly, of course). Publicly they all acknowledged Mao but privately they all tended to ignore his advice (which tended to be too radical).
Mao soon came to think the party needed to be publicly attacked and proceeded to do that via a newspaper ‘piece’. This was the origin of what came to be simply called the Cultural Revolution (CR). He adopted a tactic he had used before of bypassing the party and speaking directly to the most disadvantaged of the masses in order to gain control of the party. They naturally trusted him because of the effect of the long-standing personality cult enhanced in more recent times by the new education and publication of the ‘little red book’.
This foray into political oppositionism led at first to demonstrations and poster campaigns and soon schools and universities were in chaotic disarray (from a traditional educational perspective).
Mao made a point at around this time to publicly go swimming in the strong-flowing Yangzi to demonstrate that he still ‘had it’ even at his advanced age. When Liu, Zhou and Deng (who had previously not wanted his advice finally sought it, he pointedly refused to give it to them. Mao denounced Liu as a counter-revolutionary but as he didn’t yet have the power to remove him to a labour camp or have him executed he was only able to have him demoted to number eight in the regime. Deng was demoted to number six. With Mao’s support Lin Biao became the new head of state (Mao’s old role and Liu’s – Mao had still not formally returned to holding any position).
Groups calling themselves Red Guards formed and in speeches Mao praised their revolutionary spirit and blessed the movement. They were given free travel rights on public transport. In the year 1966 the new school year never started. In October of that year on China’s national day Mao addressed a spectacular and climactic rally at which thousands of ‘little red books’ were raised to salute him.
Mao came out against what he called the ‘four olds’ and western influence of any kind. In response, guards searched and looted homes and temples and destroyed property and people that appeared to represent these things. They encouraged peasants to attack officials.
The labels of old were brought up to persecute even the grandchildren of representatives of former ‘bad’ classes such as the landlord and rich peasant classes and to prevent them having contact with their parents who had at worst been the children of those representatives.
Various old scores were able to be settled under the cover of all of this. Even the expression of sympathy for those who were persecuted brutally in this period was suspected by many to be the expression of a bourgeois emotion.
While violence ruled in some ways in this early part of the CR it appears that going into 1967 there was a fair degree of centralised control exercised notably by Lin and Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing. Zhou had attempted to mediate between the sides but had finally been forced (or chose) to side with Mao. When a group of guards finally came for Liu and his wife, Zhou’s intercession on their behalf was to no avail. Deng was exiled. Liu was beaten and placed under house arrest before eventually being imprisoned. His wife was humiliated and sent to a camp never to see her husband again.
Meanwhile at the mass pointy end, guards’ factions began to turn on each other. Groups called ‘rebels’ also began to form (supported by Mao and Jiang) with membership drawn from young people who for class reasons had not been allowed to join the guards. One way or another the factions became armed and certain army units supported certain factions. Factions attempted to take over the party and pitched street battles were fought between various groups. Embassies were also attacked as the complex civil war gained steam.
Mao sought to end all of this in 1968 and the end finally had to be accomplished by the PLA. Mao was still revered in the army. The guards were finally ‘sent down’ to labour in the countryside with the peasants from late in that year.
In April 1969, Mao opened the 9th Party Congress. The Chinese were fighting the Russians over borders. In these circumstances Mao, quietly at first, made peaceful overtures to the US. He would never publicly admit that this was what he was doing.
Lin opposed this attempt at rapprochement and suffered for it dying while fleeing from the consequences of Mao’s wrath. His death served as the catalyst that woke up large numbers of Chinese people to Mao’s folly of the last few years.
Meanwhile, Nixon visited Beijing in February 1972. The worst of the CR was now over and the ‘barefoot doctor’ scheme of the period was actually found to have been something of a success in getting better health care to rural areas. Many including Deng were later rehabilitated. Mao at 81 was a shadow of his former self but remained a major player until his death.
The year 1976 proved a fateful year. Zhou had become ill with cancer two years earlier and finally died on 8 June 1976. Mao was too ill to attend his funeral. A Tiananmen Square tribute to Zhou turned into a protest against the so-called “Gang of Four” but indirectly against Mao, too. It was violently dealt with and at about that time an earthquake killed about 400,000 people. Traditionally in China such an event portends a change of dynasty and in fact it did. Mao’s death followed close behind it. He never publicly accepted that he had committed any substantial errors.