Politics and Political Theory in the PRC and Deng

Firstly let’s have some (neo) liberal theory ala Fukuyama. Free markets lead to a free people/middle class who then seek political liberalisation and control of the state by means of democratic reform. Then the reforms they want happen as a weakened state succumbs to the magic force of individual freedom, Deng allowed free markets, therefore democracy would eventually be forced upon him QED history is now ended. Where could this theory (admittedly very simplistically stated) go wrong? There might be obstacles to the political reform that the theory may be too incomplete to envisage and indeed there have been.

The first might be the lack of information flow that authoritarian regimes are able to bring into non-existence. The second might be cultural constraints: people might for example value peaceful illiberalism over revolutionary liberalism that might involve much more violence.

This would all be debated albeit illiberally within Deng’s illiberal reformist state.

The first debates as I noted initially helped Deng because the main initial target of democracy wall activists was the Gang of Four. I also noted that Deng quickly closed down the wall when he began to perceive the liberal thought it contained being widely disseminated didn’t accord with his own interests. Wei’s fifth modernisation made him the first dissident of the Deng era and it was also the idea that finally made the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 and not democracy inevitable, not yet at any rate.

It wasn’t as simple as Deng opposing all reformist talk all the time however. The 1980s can be viewed as the decade of a repeating liberal/illiberal loop with liberal thinking alternately encouraged, ignored and then discouraged by Deng. It must have suited Deng to be able to present himself as a kind of middle of the road compromise candidate as he consolidated his strength offering at different times something to everyone from the hard core authoritarian leftists to the most radical of the democracy reformers.

Wei could accuse Deng of becoming another Mao and Deng couldn’t easily disprove this by permitting Wei to say that without penalty (as it was he got 13 years’ gaol for ‘counter-revolutionary’ activities) but he could permit some criticism.

Was the picture of the lone man in front of four tanks in Tiananmen the best symbol of Deng’s final political legacy? Or will political liberalism finally ‘catch up’ as the above neoliberal theory supposes and be his final legacy? Did Deng weaken his state with his reformism supported by democracy activists in a kind of ‘zero sum game’ that will ultimately give this picture the power to turn humans into superhumans capable of overthrowing it? Will the internet and/or events in the Arab World and Myanmar also influence this picture?

Let’s back a little back. The wall activists were saying down with Mao and the CR and the Gang of Four but what was Wei saying in particular that Deng finally couldn’t have?

Firstly in Democracy: the Fifth Modernisation Wei was getting ahead of the game too far. Deng had proposed four modernisations and Wei had to add a fifth.

Secondly he claimed in a ‘big character poster’ and another article that Deng would have to become like Mao who he had opposed. He was arguing that the system (that therefore needed to change) caused this (making him a prominent dissident throughout the Deng years – at one point in the 1980s he emerged from gaol only to be re-gaoled soon afterwards).

What did Deng have to say about political freedoms? Firstly Deng had no special interest in or desire for democracy to come about especially quickly (if at all). His first duty as he saw it was still to Marxism in some form. Deng’s response when critical posters began to re-emerge in 1980 was to amend the constitution to ban them. Ironically, such posters were actually first specifically made constitutionally protected during the supposedly more repressive CR years.

Deng propounded his Four Cardinal Principles in March 1979 as the limits of debate. Debaters had to be following the socialist road for the PRC, accept the maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat for some time, acknowledge the rightful leadership of the Communist Party leading in that and adhere to Marxism-Leninism Mao Zedong Thought (as expressed before 1957) in any theory of government in the current socialist phase that always precedes Communism in Marxist theory.

He also produced four legal reforms in June 1979 at the 2^nd Session of the 5^th National Party Congress (NPC) defining ‘crimes’ for the first time in the history of the PRC in a criminal code and limiting the definition of ‘counter revolutionary’ crime, enshrining for the first time the notion that ‘all citizens are equal before the law’ (including non-party members) in a new procedural law, regulating and regularising joint ventures (especially with foreigners) and providing for an electoral law at the lower two levels of the People’s Congress structure.

In the following year at the 3^rd Session of the 5^th NPC (as is the practice) matters of party discipline were up for discussion (the criminal law did not apply to party members so a member had to be expelled before it could be applied to her or him). Deng called for reform there to reduce over-concentrations of power with individuals by means of holding multiple positions especially in both the party and the government, further separate party and government functions, provide for a retirement age for senior functionaries and succession and further guard against abuses of power by the further strengthening of internal party discipline by means of appropriate sanctions. These reforms were especially overdue given the continuation of criminal impunity of party members. The intra party codes would now be strengthened to mirror the criminal codes (as now formally promulgated) somewhat closely.

Party members continued to be permitted to be government officials, just with less dual posts. With regard to the retirements of people of his generation (he was in his mid 70s (having been born in 1904)) he set an example by retiring as vice-chairman of the party (though he intended to continue wielding all the power behind the scenes – he took the title ‘paramount leader’).
The two official leaders came from the next generation. They were Hu Yaobang (born in 1915 – CCP General Secretary from 1981 to 1987) and Zhao Ziyang (born in 1919 – Premier from 1983 to 1987 and CCP General Secretary from Hu’s fall in 1987 to 1989). Zhao had been somewhat instrumental in the successful agricultural reforms in Anhui leading to him being brought to Beijing.

Next week: causes and effects of Tiananmen.

From Mao to Deng

Just a little more today on what changed and what didn’t:

The first thing to note was a sense of grief and a hole to fill was left for so many Chinese by the death of Mao after he had effectively (and otherwise, it must be said) ruled China for a generation. Deng’s form of hole-filling by radical reform proved to be another kind of revolution for the many who had never known any system other than Maoism.

China still was (as it still is today) both relatively poor and relatively isolated in world terms but progress had been made (and would continue to be under Deng’s reforms). Mao’s and Deng’s goals weren’t really so different after all. China would be strong.

But many of the Chinese needed a rest as much as many others remained restless. Continuous revolution was not fun for everyone. Virtually every year since 1949 it must have seemed a violent major purge or at least a personal denunciation was liable to be just around the corner.

The CR was one of many of these types of occasions as my earlier posts record. Deng himself was a prime example having, himself, been purged and rehabilitated more than once. The violence of millions of Red Guards had barely subsided when Mao died, the Gang of Four instated their own purges, Hua had them arrested in turn in his best Mao imitation and the retributive purges continued even as Deng assumed control.

But Deng seemed inclined to lower the boom on terrorist government (at least on Mao’s scale) and there must have been many sighs of relief on all sides. Even the Red Guards themselves who ultimately felt betrayed by Mao (who had finally banished them to the countryside, remember) now breathed more freely.

Deng was a CCP man, though. So what did this mean? There would always be enemies of Communism that needed to be rooted out, that’s what.

Ironically some of the most prominent of these enemies of Communism turned out to be disillusioned Red Guards. One of the first acts of rebellion they became involved in if not against Communism then at least against the current system (even before Deng had had the chance to spell out how he intended to reform it) was the Democracy Wall movement that began in Beijing in 1978 and remained centred there. Many of those now involved in the movement were of course first politicised when they had become Red Guards during the CR.

Refreshingly, Deng announced his approval of the movement (Mao had done something similar, though, with his ‘Hundred Flowers’ comments – could Deng be trusted any more than Mao?) And in this case this was just before he assumed power. As had occurred with Mao, expressions of approval of an ideological movement spurred it on – they chose to again trust their at least hoped-for leadership.

Deng then brought in his reforms and the people waited to see how it would turn out. Would he ultimately welcome the democracy first sought by the May Fourth Movement in 1919? Maybe not.

Better international relations were now on the agenda. The US and China were ready for rapprochement. By 1 January 1979 they had established full diplomatic relations and later that month Deng visited President Carter becoming the first Chinese leader ever to visit the US. Deng was impressed by the technology and material conditions he witnessed on this visit. He, in turn, impressed everybody he met in the US with his vision for China and its relations with the West.

Like Mao, Deng was prepared to turn on dissenters and soon the democracy wall demonstrators that had supported his own rise to power were going too far for him. Deng had wanted four modernisations and Wei Jingsheng, for example, suggested democracy as a fifth.

Deng as readily referred to people like Wei as counter revolutionary as Mao had called Deng that. He began to suppress the movement in Mao style (if a little less violently) and the wall was soon shut down. Notably most of the wall activity had actually been conducted with due regard to the Four Cardinal Principles Deng delineated that I will refer to in a later post.
The reality was that Deng copied Mao’s legal methods in that laws that no one could possibly follow were always kept in reserve to justify any repression as and when it was desired by the leader.

Deng’s next concern in terms of dissent would be potentially brought about by the local devastating drought in Anhui province (also in 1978). Chinese agriculture was still close to a subsistence proposition in a typical year and employing most Chinese so drought was a particular concern in China. The large communes didn’t help matters. In response, local authorities, inspired by the peasants themselves, tried the system that would work and later go national. The productivity in Anhui boomed in response to this new incentivisation. Famine was averted but rolling out the scheme nationally still turned out to be a test of Deng’s power base.

Deng’s ‘capitalist roader’ tag still had the power to tie his hands regardless of how successful (and in fact saving) capitalism could be shown to be. He was finally able to squeeze the reform through, however. It also proved itself almost immediately nationwide in terms of productivity. Along with the local produce and other markets, small factories producing consumer items for market also began to spontaneously sprout up in rural areas.

The two major figures standing with Deng then were Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang and they both also favoured the market.

Foreign capitalists found they were now welcomed, too (initially principally in the SEZs). The foreigners in the zones were popular with locals because they had deeper pockets and this attracted Chinese from all over China hoping for a share of their apparent largesse. Chinese wages and standards of living were higher there but the increases eventually flowed throughout much of the Chinese economy especially in the south of the country (because most of the initial zones were concentrated there. The coastal city special areas were more evenly spread between north and south).

The youth of these zones soon began to live a noticeably more decadent and capitalist lifestyle and to lose some respect for socialism. Prostitution and other supposed signs of vice soon began to flourish there.

Deng’s response (under some pressure from the left to prove his credentials) was to begin a campaign against ‘moral pollution’. After decades of Maoism this comparatively mild effort was treated as a bit of a joke, though. In one oft repeated story a particularly zealous official involving himself in the campaign criticised somebody who possessed a book containing a picture of a western woman with a low cut dress. The woman in question turned out to be Marx’s wife. Meanwhile, investors apparently weren’t getting the joke and Deng was forced to end the scary campaign before it had really begun to assuage their fears. Nevertheless thousands of smugglers had been arrested as part of the campaign.

Deng successfully negotiated the 1997 handover of Hong Kong following the expiration of Britain’s lease with the Thatcher government despite Thatcher’s apparent misgivings, another coup for south China. He used a combination of a few threats and agreement to the concept of ‘one state two systems’ to get that happening, the latter leading to more local name-calling to the effect that he was excessively ‘rightist’. The name-callers probably never had to deal with the “Iron Lady” themselves and in fact Deng once remarked that in these discussions he was “the Iron Man meeting the Iron Lady”.

Deng’s other two notable reforms were to allow the practice of religions more freely again and to reduce the length of the working week. All in all, the economic and social reforms I’ve outlined in these last couple of posts saw Deng riding a wave of popularity by the time of the PRC’s 35^th anniversary celebrations in 1984. In the next few posts I’ll focus a little more on political, party and legal reforms in the Deng era especially as it continued from here (and prospects for more).

Deng the Economist and ‘Capitalist Roader’

So now it’s time to move on from Mao and all his successes and failures and consider what did Deng do? As I mentioned earlier I also want to explore the surprisingly positive economic legacy of Mao. I'll also do that here.

Incidentally Liao Yiwu is in Surry Hills Monday night (21 November 2011) as a belated part of this year's Sydney Writers' Festival (he was refused permission by the Chinese authorities that are Deng's successors to visit the US in April and attend the festival in May - he is now in exile since having apparently been forced to exit China irregularly). See http://www.swf.org.au/201110251054/home-page/liao-yiwu.html (the festival page for the event - it's apparently at the Belvoir Theatre) for more details. He seems to think he may be able to end his exile with the end of Hu Jintao's term in office next year (per an article in the New Yorker). Kommt zeit kommt rat!

After Mao’s death in 1976 a struggle for power ensued that Deng finally won in 1978. In so doing he and his supporters defeated the Gang of Four and their less numerous and less ardent supporters. Besides the Gang of Four, a possible compromise candidate, Hua Guofeng, also looked like a player for a time. He was also apparently Mao’s final personal choice for a successor. His policies were derided by all sides however as ‘whateverism’ policies as he had the tendency to model himself upon Mao and explicitly prefer doing ‘whatever Mao did’.

Deng’s victory became clear publicly at the 3^rd Plenum of the 11^th Central Committee in December 1978 when he also propounded his programme. By this time Hua had had the Gang of Four arrested and become himself a mere figurehead.

There would be a shift in CCP focus from class struggle to economic construction via the ‘four modernisations’. This was a Zhou term. The point of the change was to dial the politics back in favour of pragmatism. In defending his black-hatted (from Mao’s perspective) and ‘capitalist road’ approach to economic development Deng was wont to say something like “it doesn’t matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice”. Political ‘colour’ was less important in the moment than what got the economic job done.

The more radical of Mao’s ideas were explicitly rejected and his class labels were all repudiated (as long as one didn’t oppose Deng or Dengism – that could still lead to a lifelong label that one still wouldn’t like and that could also stick to one's family). The vast majority of formerly specifically denounced bureaucrats and others were given their old jobs back. The term used for this was ‘rehabilitation’. And finally in 1981 we had the 70% good 30% bad statement in the CCP’s Resolution on Party History about which I have written in earlier posts. This was an assessment of Mao as both a man and a leader.

Just let’s have a brief look at Mao’s economic record, though, before we move on, as that was now to be Deng’s explicit interest. In fact the economic record may be surprisingly good to some (and his social record, too, was at least generally fair). China is regarded in the fields of Economic History and Developmental Economics as one of the 'major economy late modernisers' or 'late industrialisers' (along with Germany, Japan and the USSR) so it is fairest to compare China’s fundamentals with those of those three economies in their respective growth spurt periods (usually a few decades was the crucial period – early developers took longer as they had to invent more things from scratch).

Germany’s growth rate per decade in its spurt period (1880 to 1914) was 33%, Japan’s (from 1874 to 1929) was 43%, the USSR’s (from 1928 to 1958) was 54% and China’s (from 1952 to 1972) was 64%. So it’s not a bad record over a sustained spurt period even if we allow that China may have come from a slightly lower base. The down side is that China seems to have run out of spurt a little sooner (after two decades compared to Japan’s at the most impressive five and a half decades).

From 1952 to 1977 industrial output increased 11.3% per annum, agricultural output increased 2.3% per annum and population increased by 2.0% per annum. Here are some more impressive and more specific output and demography figures for China for around that period:

	1952	1976
Steel output	1.3 million tons	23 million tons
Coal mined	66 million tons	448 million tons
Crude oil produced	0 million tons	28 million tons
Fertilizer produced	0.2 million tons	28 million tons
Cement produced	3 million tons	49 million tons
Electricity produced	7 billion kilowatt hours	133 billion kilowatt hours
Size of Employed Industrial Workforce	3 million industrial workers	50 million industrial workers
Size of Employed Scientific Workforce	50,000 scientists (1949)	5,000,000 scientists

There were also fair records in educational development that made the above possible but especially of girls and young women and in both rural and urban settings that if anything Deng’s accession interrupted (albeit briefly). Sixty percent of fifteen year old girls in China in 1946 had received no formal education according to statistics produced by Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish in Chinese Urban Life under Reform: the Changing Social Contract (Cambridge University Press: 2000) but half had received a least some Junior Secondary education by the year of Mao’s death according to Tang and Parish’s statistics. That’s the change over thirty years. The small percentage who had received advanced education also nearly tripled (from around 2.5% to around 7.5%). I don’t have the text to hand but that information may be specific to rural females (despite a title that might suggest an urban focus) but, wherever it relates to, the trend is the notable thing rather than absolutes and locations. It’s possibly even more impressive if they are rural figures, though. So Mao was (perhaps more than adequately) setting Deng up for some success.

The actual ‘Nuts and Bolts’ of the CR – the Schema

Mao had written many years before the official CR words to the effect that “a revolution is not a dinner party” and here he was about to prove this yet again. “Continuous Revolution” also required continuous chaos, rebellion and violence. I’m now considering the specific objectives as they were outlined and met in the fulfilment of Mao’s new CR strategy.

The first and really a proto-CR objective was the object of the PLA. It was to create the class (called “revolutionary successors”) that would meet the further objectives and it was met in the period 1963 to 1966. This involved the training of youth in the Mao cult. Maoists saw only the youth as completely trustworthy as they were considered untainted by pre-1949 society and ideas. The principal campaigns that were to inspire the ‘revolutionary successors’ were Mao’s socialist education campaign and the ‘learn from the PLA’ campaign.

Further, Maoists believed revolution must be “done” in order to be understood and so the youth would be encouraged to “do” it (as understanding revolution was deemed a good thing). They would “do” the CR and the principal first objects to have things “done” to them were revisionist backsliders within the CCP and their lackeys. Mao had no faith left in either most of the leadership of the party or the intelligentsia. Metaphorical calls were made to “bombard the headquarters” and who knew if they would ultimately have to be taken literally. With the successors now revved up, the “party” could now begin with the Red Guards as the hosts. The two clear objectives of the CR were to eliminate all revisionism and ‘smash’ the four olds and they were both to be accomplished in short order (in the period from August to December 1966). So the ‘capitalist roaders’ were to be identified, attacked and overthrown so that the real CR (the final elimination of all feudal and bourgeois cultural hangovers through ‘smashing the four olds’) could then happen unimpeded. The four olds included anything religious, traditional or Western. This was only phase one.

Next, people then had to put in to replace the deposed bureaucrats and this was essentially the next phase accomplished in 1967 and 1968. First in 1967 Red Guards and worker ‘rebels’ forcibly assumed control of all organisational and social units (mostly the factories and communes) and workers replaced the party structure with 1848 Paris Commune-style ‘workers’ and people’s committees’ that Commune having been so admired by Marx himself as a potential model. The overthrow of Shanghai city government was especially closely modelled on the history of that 'model' Commune. So admired was the Shanghai ‘coup’ that three of the people involved were later to form the Gang of Four with Mao’s wife. Workers assumed more of a role than the Red Guards here as it was their units being taken over. This was the period when Red Guards frequently began to fight each other. The final part of this phase occurred in July and August of 1968 and was carried out by the PLA. It was a reversal of the first two parts of the phase, as I’ve noted – the Red Guards and worker ‘rebels’ were finally suppressed themselves and sent down to the countryside for more education by work. This was actually the deadliest period as the PLA killed Red Guards on quite a large scale essentially because while they were much better armed and organised than the chaotic Guards forces the Guards still often refused to peacefully and meekly submit to PLA suppression.

The final phase was a kind of reversal of the first two which created power vacuums. It was about filling the vacuum and was accomplished by the PLA in August and September of 1968 and by the PLA and the CCP in 1969. The Paris Commune-like ‘mass organisations’ were replaced by PLA-dominated ‘revolutionary committees’ in 1968 that supported the rebuilding of the party and in 1969 the re-building of the party structure was then finally undertaken with the support of the PLA and the Shanghai radicals. The CR had reduced the ranks of those able to rebuild the party but the final outcomes of this phase were the decisions of the 9^th party Congress in 1969 designed to present a show of unity to the outside world or to signal an end to further disputation.